Britain’s contribution to the Balochistan problem

Ever since Pakistan got independence, the areas that constitute today’s Balochistan were comparatively more backward and underdeveloped. Unlike other Indian cities and provinces, Baloch territories, albeit harboring some British-made roads and infrastructure, cannot claim to have inherited British ‘infrastructure’ in communication. The only road network it has got was to facilitate British troop movement across the province to neighboring states.

The Balochistan issue has roots, not in the inception of Pakistan, rather they go back to pre-partitioned India. Pakistan's formation and the events that followed over the next couple of decades made this issue only worse. Anyhow, to have a proper examination of the Balochistan issue, we have to go as back in history as possible. Any half-hearted attempt at explaining a Baloch tribesman’s hostility towards the Pak military may win us our first published book, or a lengthy article, but it will never give us inferential and satisfactory answers.

In order not to exceed the boundaries of my title, I would only shed light on Britain’s role in the gradual deterioration of the Baloch people. This aspect of the Balochistan issue is discussed rarely even in Baloch Nationalist circles, let alone political intellectual debates. Yet, the mass this argument carries is unimaginably great.

The central theme in Britain’s handling of the Baloch areas was the ‘Great Game’ between Russia and Britain. Just as the cold war brought about great changes in the global geography, so did ‘the great game’, though in a more secretive manner. The cold war happened to coincide with a somewhat principled International diplomatic environment. Whereas the great game was ripe when democratic norms weren’t as ubiquitous; my point being: the rules of the game were shadowy.

Put simply, the tsarist empire, similar to the ‘civilized’ Britain, harbored expansionist plans which rang alarm bells in London. The thought of Russia reaching the borders of the Indian subcontinent was a nightmare for the British. ‘No two great powers ought to ever meet each other, there must be a third buffer nation in between’ thought British military planners. Thus arose the concept of having a ‘frontier of separation’ aka buffer state as opposed to a ‘frontier of contact’ (common border) between two great powers.

The buffer state in this case was to be Afghanistan. That being said, any pro-Russia ‘miscreants’ in Afghanistan needed to be dealt with with an iron fist. British saw an adversary in Afghan ruler Dost Muhammad and thought he might give way to Russian influence. This led to the British advance to Afghanistan to ensure Afghanistan remained a buffer zone.

The British presence in Afghanistan was not manageable without the troops first grounding in Balochistan. Baloch areas under the rule of Khan of Kalat were not a part of the British empire per se, nor did they belong to the princely state category. They could be categorized under a de facto third category, similar to princely states, but with more freedom. The British sought safe passage from the Khan of Kalat who agreed, but the British were still attacked by some Baloch tribes. This act angered Britain and resulted in the invasion of Balochistan. It was a defining moment in the history of the Baloch areas.

In Baloch national evolution, the element of being ruled by a foreign power has largely been absent. Much like the Pashtuns, Balochis have little experience of being ruled by a foreign power. For centuries, harsh and unhospitable terrain kept many foreign invaders at bay, consequently, giving no chance to a national reactionary uprising that could fuel nationalistic emotions. Britain's arrival sowed the seed of nationalism.

Britain was too clever and experienced to turn a blind eye to it. Hence, their entire stay in Balochistan highlights how systematically they tried to sever Baloch nationalism through different techniques.

The invasion of Balochistan brought forth new challenges for the British. Should the powers be disposed of to the Khan or should the tribal leaders directly be on the payroll of the British? This and similar questions were placed before the British military planners. Like other frontier territories, Baloch areas inhabit tribal confederacies similar to those of the Pushtun belt in the northwest.

The British experimented first by giving authority to the Khan which didn’t end well, and later, by dealing with the tribal leaders directly. The latter ensured the tribal chiefs were in the British hands. Thus, by strengthening the Sardari system British seized direct control of Balochistan. It is noteworthy to mention that it is this exact policy that was later inherited by Pakistani rulers. The Sardari system has historically been an inhibitor of nationalism because feuds between sardars can pit an entire tribe against another.

The British also gave vast chunks of Baloch lands to Afghanistan and Iran in a bid to placate their rulers, taking into consent only a handful of sycophant sardars. Afghanistan and Iran were players in the great game, with whom Britain tried to remain congenial for its own interests. Whatever the intention on Britain’s part, this act caused irreparable damage to the Baloch national identity. This was the first attempt at divide and conquer in Balochistan.

Other similar attempts include Britain’s branding of Brahvi Baloch as a separate caste in Balochistan. The British in every of their census and demographic documents, differentiated between the Brahvis and Baloch populations, by categorizing Brahvis in a separate category of their own, thereby implying that Brahvis are not Balochis. This was an effective way of causing discord among the already weakened Baloch. Many notable Balochis, including the Khan of Kalat himself, tried to debunk this preposterous claim, but the damage was done.

The direction I’m taking this article toward is to imply that all of the Pakistani establishment's ways of handling the Baloch issue are in fact borrowed from the Britishers. These policies were the brainchild of our former colonial masters. Why is Britain’s role often overlooked then? Perhaps because it is logical to expect from a colonial power to do what Britain did. Pakistan, though, would come under the spotlight if it continued with Britain’s policies because the idea of Pakistan was conceived to grant protection to the minority.